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Preface 
Whenever new technologies are introduced systematic changes in the social stratification of 
societies are to be expected, as theories on the relationship between social inequality and 
technology suggest (Rogers 1995, Webster 1997, Castells 1997). The digital divide is a model 
case for a systematic change; ever more information is available exclusively via the Internet 
and only those who are online benefit from this development. Attempting to assemble an 
exhaustive list on the available online information seems like a hopeless task: Daily politics, 
online education, health news, technical ideas, job ads or applications, dangerous consumer 
products, opinions, personal data, communal forms, inquiries, public policy, banking, 
brokerage, phone numbers, addresses – the number of informational items addressed online is 
growing daily. Some people swear that these changes are making their life easier while others 
complain about informational overcrowding, because they are no longer able to discern the 
important from the dispensable. Whatever stance we take in the current debate on the 
emerging “information society”, it is here to stay and people who remain offline disqualify as 
full members.  
What makes computers and Internet so unlike other household technology is their 
manifold but often complicated application in the human-computer and interpersonal 
interaction, regarding dyads (n=2) as well as exceptionally large groups (n → 801.4 million, 
total online population in 2005, CIA 2006). Issues connected to the use of the new 
technologies draw attention to fact that the digital divide is not only related to the inquiry into 
who has and who does not have access. Very often we fail to notice whether people are able 
to adequately apply the technology, i.e. feel competent enough to search the Internet and get 
the results they were looking for in the first place. To date, no internationally comparative 
study has been carried out comparing the average level of versatility, skills, or proficiency of 
computer- and Internet users in different countries. Publicly available data on average 
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computer or Internet skills are rare and the current study is no exception. Only in Chapter 6 
are aspects of qualitative computer and Internet use presented – a comparison of computer 
and Internet activities between different social groups.1  
I hope the results of my current studies will strengthen the conviction that it is time to 
gather additional publicly available data on the quality of Internet and computer use. For 
several years, however, the most pressing issue has been access rather than proficiency, as 
diffusion rates in most countries stopped increasing at a 50 to 60% household level. Thus, the 
“why” of computer und Internet access is what most of the chapters deal with. The results in 
several of the following chapters show that the use of new technologies is by no means status 
“neutral” as it appears to be at first glance; the research problem is multi-dimensional.  
The interdependence of social structure and computer and Internet use sparked my 
curiosity back in the year of 2000, when I prepared the first drafts of my current project. In 
various places of this compendium I discuss the effects of the digital divide on gaining socio-
economic advantages, and they are manifold. This compilation – to quote Hannah Arendt  – 
“obviously could contain more or fewer chapters without for that reason changing its 
character “ (1961: 15). Article upon article could have been stacked, but the gist of it is 
contained in the current selection. Therefore, a decision was made to draw the line at some 
point and present my results. The reader will find a structured overview on what causes the 
digital divide and what consequences to expect from this newly emerging division.  
                                                 
1
 I remain indebted to Jürgen Schupp from the DIW in Berlin for supporting my requests from within the 
institute to get more information on the second digital divide. To my knowledge the GSOEP special survey 2005 
has remained the only publicly available set of data on contextual computer and Internet use thus far. 
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1. Introduction 
Never before in history has it been possible to exchange such quantities of man made 
information in such little time at such short notice. Today we are living in a society where 
information technology has fundamentally transformed the flow of knowledge, global 
economy, social interaction, and information networks – we have entered a “network age” 
(Servon 2002). The questions that arise while observing these changes are how they affect 
existing power relations and patterns of social inequality. At the end of 2003, a declaration of 
the UN at the world summit in Geneva contained a statement “[…] to build a people-centred, 
inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, 
utilize and share information and knowledge […]” (source: www.itu.int/wsis). This is an 
official recognition at an international level of how important the participation of common 
people is for developing informational skills. Since then an annual world summit on the 
information society has been hosted by the UN (on May, 15th). 
In Germany, indications exist that the transmission of messages via electronic media 
has reached the status of fulfilling a basic need in view of the proportion of income allotted to 
communication (Noll & Weick 2005). But the chances of people in society to access and use 
computers and the Internet are heavily biased indicating a newly emerging pattern of social 
inequality. When we study trends and reasons for the number of people who access and use 
computers and Internet within and across societies we are analysing the digital divide.  
What is meant by this abstract terminology is the division between individuals and 
households at different socio-economic levels, regarding their likelihood to access and use 
computers and Internet. The scientific relevance of the digital divide involves the introduction 
of a new perspective in studies on social stratification. Important questions cover aspects of 
model optimization, the identification of new crucial variables for studies in social inequality, 
and the introduction of external innovation effects on modern social settings. Socially relevant 
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topics involve studying trends in social inequality, the identification of endangered groups, 
and mapping prospective future developments. 
 
1.1. Technology and Socioeconomic Inequality 
First studies on this topic began to appear during the 1980s, coinciding with the increased use 
of computers at home and in companies. In 1986, Hammond questioned Daniel Bell’s (1973) 
notion of knowledge becoming an “axial principle” in modern societies. Recent results 
regarding the interrelationship between the digital divide and social inequality, though, are 
putting more emphasis on this principle. Of course, rarely ever does the reality of innovation 
adoption follow a smooth, well-behaved, linear process as outlined in Rogers’ diffusion 
theory (1995, see Chapter 1.2.1, below). Frequently, innovations happen to emerge in a rather 
complex, uncertain, or disorderly fashion (Kline & Rosenberg 1986). After the success of a 
new technology has been positively identified, the number of people who access and use it is 
supposed to increase. This assumption has lead researchers to believe that in the long run the 
digital divide might dissolve just like a fata morgana, i.e. time would take care of the problem 
(e.g. Compaine 2001).  
However, such an assumption has to be hedged with caveats. Since 1996, more than 
500 studies have appeared underlining the intense and solid relation between the digital divide 
and social stratification. Until today computers have not yet reached the developmental stage 
of a “push-and-go” application like telephones or mobile phones. Computer and Internet are 
complex multi-tasked technologies where people need specific skills to launch applications 
and efficiently use the devices for their daily routines. What is more, although the overall use 
of computers (but not the Internet) has gone beyond the 60% margin these days (Chapter 5), 
considering the socioeconomic background of the users we observe a heavily lop-sided 
profile: native young males with a high education are much more likely to belong to the group 
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of computer literates than, e.g., elderly foreign females with a low educational background 
(Chapter 3). As computer literacy is linked to issues like formal education, labour market 
chances, public policy, social networks, life satisfaction, or political influence unequal 
distribution already increasingly influence current social settings (e.g., Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2006, pp. 524).  
 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
Although the study of the digital divide is relatively new to the agenda of research on social 
inequality, several theoretical streams may be discerned discussed in detail below. The order 
of their presentation is according to the extent to which they entail technical details on the one 
side of the scale and social interaction on the other side of the scale. Neither of the theoretical 
approaches presented here can do without these two ingredients, because studying the digital 
divide covers issues on technology implementations as well as social behaviour.  
Theoretical notions picturing the outcomes of social relations can serve a number of 
issues. In the next paragraph Everett Rogers’ (1995) diffusion theory is addressed which 
infuses several theoretical ideas derived from the natural sciences and underlines that the 
digital divide is a temporary phenomenon. On the contrary, critical theory (mainly by Herbert 
Schiller) upholds that the introduction of new technologies reinforces traditional lines of 
social inequality, deepening the gap between the informational “haves” and the “have-nots”. 
Schiller, for example, looks intensely at the quality of information. He coined the term 
“garbage information” that diverts, amuses, or gossips but offers little value and insinuates 
that the people at the bottom of the class system are swamped by this sort of information. On 
the other hand, privileged people are “[…] able to extend their advantages by access to 
sophisticated information resources” (Webster 1997, p. 91). The third general theoretical 
stance presented here, covered by the micro, meso, and macro level model, is designed to 
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facilitate empirical comparisons and track down current societal developments with regard to 
the digital divide (Korupp 2006, Korupp & Szydlik 2005).  
 
1.2.1 Diffusion Theory 
The diffusion theory methodically maps out the way how new technologies enter modern 
societies and how their use inter-depends on social interaction and human network ecology 
(Rogers 1995). Diffusion theory is lop-sided towards technical details. Two fundamental 
frameworks need to be understood in order to grasp the outline of diffusion theory and its 
application to research on the digital divide.  
Firstly, a sigmoid curve depicts the time and shape of the process through which new 
technologies diffuse into a modern society. Secondly, user typologies (in the sense of Max 
Weber’s ideal types) are normally distributed in society. These two basic abstract traits are 
best detailed using graphical displays of how this terminology may be understood. The basic 
model of diffusion dynamics slowly slopes upward until a so-called “critical mass” is reached 
(see Figure 1). Beyond this point adoption rates increase quickly. Note, however, that a time 
frame for the diffusion rates is not specified in the Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: S-shaped Adoption Curve (Rogers 1995:314). 
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To explain why inequality of access occurs, Rogers created five ideal adopter categories. 
Figure 2 depicts the population distribution of these categories. The diffusion of innovation is 
assumed to run from the left category (Innovators) to the category on the right (Laggards).  
 
Figure 2: Adopter Categories (Rogers 1995:262). 
 
The swiftness of technology adoption is dependent on several individual characteristics. So-
called Innovators are the first to try out new technologies. Inventors may form a part of this 
group, although by no means an exclusive part. They are usually wealthy, young, and well-
educated. Economic resources are needed to cut economic losses in case a new technology 
fails to succeed in an initial trial period (as did, for example, the invention of the visual 
phone). Additionally, they are young and entrepreneurial and like to try out something new. A 
good education is needed in order to be well-informed and have sufficient resources to handle 
new inventions.  
Following the Innovators, Early Adopters start using a new technology after it has 
undergone a successful initial trial period. This second ideal type is supposed to have opinion 
leadership – today we probably would label them “trendsetters” – leading their followers (the 
Early Majority) on to try out something new. After the Early Majority has adopted the 
innovation they are followed by the Late Majority. The Laggards at the other end of the 
distribution are the last to adopt new technologies and some of them never do. Laggards are 
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often elderly people and to some extend socially isolated. The socio-economic status for these 
adopter categories is assumed to decrease, starting with the Innovators and ending with the 
Laggards.  
Thus, according to the diffusion theory the adoption of new technologies is determined 
by people’s age, the nature of their social networks, and their socio-economic background. 
These background traits, however, only influence the swiftness of adoption. Over time, 
successful new technologies are adopted by every individual in a society (see Figure 1).  
 
1.2.2 Class Theory 
The connection of social class and new technologies can be traced back to Herbert Irving 
Schiller a renowned media critic and sociologist. He critically assessed the relationship 
between the access to media and power, particularly with regard to information content. His 
main stance is that although there have been technological changes and the very infrastructure 
of data exchange has altered considerably, capitalism and traditional antagonistic class 
relations remained constant (Schiller 1981).  
Among critical theorists, this notion has not gone uncontested. Although the 
capitalistic system has continued to stay intact, Kellner (1989), for instance, emphasizes that 
the contemporary economic system has evolved into something he labels “techno-capitalism”, 
where knowledge and information equipment “[…] play increasingly important roles in the 
production process, the organization of society and everyday life” (p. 180). According to 
Webster (1997), however, the crucial focus of Marxian theory continues to rest on the role of 
power, control, and interest. Thus, neither of the above viewpoints invalidates the traditional 
theoretical terminology used by earlier generations of Marxists.  
 Within critical theory, information is understood as an intensely self-interest serving 
commodity. It is particularly important to recognize the role of power and control here. 
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Schiller (2004) offers myriad examples, picturing the small (and declining) number of media 
companies that are currently undermining the doctrine of free speech, or the increased 
commercialisation of the universities where ties between university researchers and private 
cooperation have grown quite close, or the commercialisation and privatisation of government 
information, often claimed by departing officials. The power of information access or 
selective obliteration is used to monopolize public communication, deal making or selling of 
scientific findings, and regarding public information as private property that may be sold as 
personal memories or historical studies. Schiller holds that the information society revolution 
has mainly served the interests of wealthy and affluent users, who to date gained easy access 
to a vast arena of important information. For the larger part of the population, however, “[…] 
the quality and the availability of information leaves a lot to be desired” (2004: 265).  
The historical development is pictured in austere colours. He draws close connections 
between the development of the information “highways” and the steady growth of corporate 
powers over the last fifty years. In many post-industrial societies rudimentary 
commercialisation has taken over, myriad public functions have become privatised, and an 
increasing number economic activity is constantly being deregulated. Schiller (1989) holds 
that information and quality data serve mainly to meet the needs of the affluent segment of the 
population whilst the larger part of society is cut off from this information “revolution”. For 
him the newly emerging technology of the Internet is no exemption to this phenomenon, as 
plans to commercialise the Internet are steadily progressing and may be expected to be 
implemented in the near future (ibid.). According to critical theory it cannot assumed the 
digital gap will close at any time, because political interests and traditional power relations 
systematically undermine progress towards more socioeconomic justice.  
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1.2.3 The Micro-Meso-Macro Model 
In theoretical models, the use of computers resides at the highest level of a multidimensional 
concept of information technology access (De Haan 2004). The use of computers is based on 
skills, which are based on possession, in turn resting on motivation. Without having passed 
any of the former stages, people are unlikely to use computers for their private means. 
Starting from this perspective, the digital divide is incorporated into a multi-dimensional 
framework. Who are early adopters and why are they the first in line to use computers for 
their private means? Regarding the micro-level, one is mainly looking at effects of knowledge 
or human capital, that is, education and computer literacy. For the meso-level one can identify 
household settings and their influence on individual computer use. Thirdly, the macro-level 
includes domains of group membership, that is, generation, gender, ethnic background, and 
national differences (see Figure 3).  
  
Figure 3: A Theoretical Model of the Digital Divide. 
Concentrating on the micro-level, knowledge or human capital includes general and specific 
schooling and training, for example, high school diplomas or vocational training (Becker 
1964). Levels of education and vocational training are positively connected to people’s use of 
computers; computer literacy is merely an additional educational skill. Getting acquainted 
Macro-Level: The Social Context 
Meso-Level: The Household 
Micro-Level: Knowledge 
Influence Private Computer Use 
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with computers at work (usually in white-collar jobs) increases the likelihood that a person 
uses one for private purposes.  
Focusing on the meso-level, situated between the individual and the societal level, the 
focus should rest on household composition and consumption restrictions, embedded within a 
socio-ecological framework (Watt & White 1999). The socio-ecological periphery includes 
habitation and technological environment. The incentives for children to deal with computers 
are straightforward: Computer use includes playing games interactively and facilitates doing 
schoolwork (Leu 1991). While catching the attention of children, teenagers, or young adults, 
the question remains how children induce their parents to use computers.2 Several issues are 
relevant. For instance, parents want to protect their children from unwanted informational 
content. The best way of doing so is to know how computers work and control the content 
offered. At this point patterns of computer use are located in families at the level of control 
and regulation (Beisenherz 1988). The second issue, consumption restrictions, should mirror 
the structure of economic inequality (Ekdahl & Trojer 2002, Martin & Robinson 2004).  
Regarding the macro-level, several potential determinants are identified: generation, 
gender, ethnicity, and regional differences. The theoretical approach including generations is 
derived from a concept called “technical generations” and outlines four ideal types 
(Sackmann and Weymann1995): The “pre-technical generation” (born before 1939) grew up 
in an environment bare of household technology; the “generation of the household revolution” 
(born between 1939 and 1948) was raised while basic kitchen technology like kettles and 
refrigerators diffused into private households; the third “generation of advanced household 
technology” (born between 1949 and 1964) grew up with inventions like the washing 
machine, stoves, central heating, i.e. more sophisticated technology; the following “computer 
generation” (born after 1964) was raised with an increasingly digitalized set of home 
                                                 
2
 To this day, the effects of computer use on children’s social development cannot be predicted precisely (e.g. 
Subrahmanyam et al. 2000).  
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technology. Today computer chips are implemented in microwaves, washing machines, 
fridges, telephones, heating systems etc. According to the technological generations approach, 
the home environment that people are raised in determines their general habits towards new 
technologies later in life.  
Aspects of gender are of crucial importance because sex roles are determined by a 
whole set of social norms and values (see Chafetz 2006). Today we still observe a troubling 
gender inequality when it comes to judging participation rates of women in any of the related 
fields of information technology (Fountain 2000, Korupp 2006, Korupp et al. 2006). Census 
data show that fewer women than men own a computer, particularly if they live in a single 
household (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003, p.24). Some researchers suggest that women are 
not socialized to become involved in matters of technology (Brunet & Proulx 1989, Newman 
et al. 1995). Regarding computers, however, both men and women are fascinated by the 
multitudinal applications of this new technology, but women are less emotional about 
computers and geared mainly towards practical applications (Löchel 1992, Fox 2006).  
 Ethnic differences for computer use are no longer a debated issue. Continuously 
disputed are the reasons for ethnic differences in the distribution of computer and Internet 
users. People of other than the major native ethnic group may tend to perceive a computer 
language to be culturally different, to belong to a so-called outer sphere (Nohl 2001). Most of 
the computer programs bought in a country use native languages or English languages for 
their user interfaces. These distinctions may cause delayed diffusion of computers among the 
different ethnic minority.  
In different regions large differences continue to exist including average prosperity, 
labour market chances, or political influence. Regarding Germany, for instance, in 1993, the 
first official numbers on the distribution of home computers showed PC ownership in West 
Germany to be at a 22.4% level, compared to only 16.3% of the households in East Germany 
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(Statistisches Bundesamt 1994).3 Unequal starting positions at the beginning of the 
information revolution may be responsible for regional differences and ought to be considered 
in studies on the digital divide. Altogether, this model forms no unilateral theoretical stance, 
but is meant to capture the multidimensional aspects of the digital divide.  
 
1.3 Summary of this Study 
How the digital divide is affected by and affects the fabric of social inequality is the main 
focus in all of the chapters of this compendium. In the second Chapter a historical account on 
the effect of the introduction of computer technology on income is offered capturing 
significant changes between 1979, 1986, 1992, and 1999. Empirical analyses are based on 
four large German labour market censuses with approximately 87,000 cases. Results show 
that in 1979, the use of a computer at work increases income levels of (male) workers, albeit 
for people who are working in the information segment of the labour market. Over time, 
advantages regarding the early adoption of this new technology slowly disappear. Effects of 
computer training on income levels cease to exist between the years of 1979 and 1999. 
Chapter 3 offers an empirical model that shows the first attempt to test the micro, 
meso, macro model. The empirical findings are replicated for the years of 1997 and 2001 of 
the GSOEP. Large net effects are observed on the macro-level, for gender, Turkish ethnicity, 
and generation. On the micro- and the meso-level the net effects are substantial, too. 
Knowledge and household setting significantly add to explain who accesses computers and 
who does not. It remains an open question as to how a potential lack of primary social ties, i.e. 
living with children, may be compensated to help close the digital divide. 
After the empirical replication a repeated attempt to empirically analyse the outcomes 
of the micro, meso, macro model is broadened into a social trend analysis in Chapter 4. The 
                                                 
3
 Before that, the statistical yearbook of the GDR offers information on radio and TV ownership only. From 
1990 to 1993, the statistical yearbook for the reunited Germany contains information on PC ownership in West 
Germany only. 
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1997, 2001, and 2003 GSOEP waves contain data on private computer and internet use, as 
well as information on past and present socioeconomic circumstances. Results show that in 
2003, membership of technical generations and ethnic background in large part determines 
the use of new technologies. By illustrating the importance of human capital and family 
context we are able to explain additional differences found for computer and internet use. 
Effects of income, gender, and living in a single household are significant. Our study shows 
that some of the long-term consequences of the 40-year German separation are diminishing 
with regard to computer use. We demonstrate that human and social capital are more 
important than economic capital to explain private computer and internet use. Indications for 
higher social classes to secure or even increase their favourable social positions exist. Most of 
the empirical work was carried out by the first author. Marc Szydlik gave ample input to help 
me refine the theoretical and empirical model in Chapter 4, which more than merits his 
inclusion as a co-author on this paper. 
Research on the digital divide has been widely criticised for exclusively focussing on 
the first digital divide – access to computers and Internet. The results of Chapter 5 add 
insights on how socioeconomic background is related to the second digital divide, i.e. levels 
of competence for using computers and Internet. Working hypotheses are derived from 
diffusion theory. Gender and nationality are introduced as important characteristics. Results 
from the GSOEP special survey of 2005 indicate that gender, generation membership, and 
educational level have a double edge on the digital divide: They explain access as well as 
competence for using computers and Internet. Nationality and the size of the social network 
are significant for computer and Internet access but not for levels of competence. While the 
first digital divide remains substantial, the second digital divide is following in its wake. In 
this chapter all the empirical models and statistical calculations have been carried out by the 
first author. Harald Künemend and I had a number of extensive discussions about the 
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theoretical outline of this paper, meriting his addition as a co-author to this paper. Jürgen 
Schupp supported me extensively at the DIW to place some of my questions into the GSOEP 
questionnaire of 2005 by which, as far as I am concerned, he more than earned his place on 
the list of co-authors.  
My central question in Chapter 6 is how differences in internet use for private ends in 
a European comparative perspective can be explained. A theoretical model applied to all 
member states of the European Union shows that tertiary education is the main indicator for 
internet use for private ends. But the strength of its influence varies between countries. A 
hypothesis is posed that over time the effect of tertiary education on internet use decreases as 
more users hook up to the internet. In 2002, the lowest influence is expected in countries with 
high diffusion rates and vice versa. The results show that momentarily this hypothesis may be 
maintained. Based on the empirical outcomes, an attempt is made to assort countries along 
cultural similarity. Three different “diffusion regions” are identified: The southern “diffusion 
region” consist of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Included in the eastern region are the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The central region includes Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the U.K. The most important conclusion, however, is that a country’s 
proportion of tertiary educated adults mainly determines the speed of innovation diffusion. 
In Chapter 7 the focus shifts to a special problem within the digital divide: the use of 
new technologies by senior citizens. As the Internet’s societal pervasiveness progresses, 
offline senior citizens are becoming increasingly disadvantaged regarding the quality of their 
life. We examine reasons for non-use and the development of the frequency, intensity, and 
socio-demographic correlates of Internet use among senior citizens in Europe. Consequences 
at the individual and societal level are discussed. The Eurobarometer of 2003 offers a range of 
variables to explore the diffusion of Internet technology among 55+ year-old people in 
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Europe. Descriptive statistics, logistic regressions, and a population average model are used to 
identify the correlates of Internet access in four different welfare regimes. Within the 
population segment of the senior citizens age is a stratifying variable. Marital, occupational, 
and educational status have a large impact on relative chances to access the Internet. By and 
large, gender differences do not exist. The sizes of the coefficients differ between the four 
welfare regimes although most of the results can be replicated for the European region. 
Private access possibilities, motivational indifference, and deficient knowledge seem to be the 
crucial for the decision to remain offline. Financial concerns play a minor role. Except for 
gender differences, existing socioeconomic inequalities crystallise within the senior 
population as Internet access continues to be stratified along traditional lines. Social policy 
must keep up efforts to close the digital age gap, particularly in the Southern regions of 
Europe. The joint work on this paper together with Harald Künemund contains a collaborative 
introduction, theoretical outline, and conclusion. The empirical work and statistical models, 
presentation of the results have been carried out by the first author.  
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Abstract:  In modern societies, the digital divide indicates the emergence of a new form of social inequality.  
The theoretical model presented in this paper captures effects on the micro-, meso-, and macro-level.  The 
empirical findings are replicated for the years of 1997 and 2001 of the GSOEP (the German Socio-Economic 
Panel).  Large net effects are observed on the macro-level, for gender, Turkish ethnicity, and generation.  On the 
micro- and the meso-level the net effects are substantial, too.  Knowledge and household setting significantly 
add to explain who accesses computers and who does not.  It remains an open question as to how a potential lack 
of primary social ties, i.e. living with children, may be compensated to help close the digital divide.  
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Introduction 
 
The digital divide presumably forms an additional source of inequality within the already established social 
ordering.  This sort of assumption may be challenged by charges of studying a non-existent myth or a “luxury” 
problem (Compraine, 2001).  However, research results so far paint an entirely different picture.  For example, 
computer literacy has been found to increase social activities and school performance (Wagner, Pischner, & 
Haisken-DeNew, 2001; Wagner, Pischner, & Haisken-DeNew, 2002), enhance mathematical and language skills 
(Attewell & Battle, 1999), improve successes in finding a job (Boes & Preißler, 2002), and last but not least, 
increase hourly wages (Kim, 2003).  It is, therefore, important to find out why some people use computers while 
others do not.   
 
When dealing with the digital divide, a certain lack of consistency becomes obvious as to how and for what 
purposes this terminology is used.  It may, therefore, be helpful to start with a definition.  I define the digital 
divide as the gap between the technological “haves” and “have-nots”, particularly regarding private computer 
use.  Sometimes a theoretical distinction is made between the “first” and the “second” digital divide (Attewell, 
2001), that is, between the “access” to computers and the “purpose” of computer use (Hargittai, 2002; 2004).  
The former refers to research on the use of computers while the latter deals with the diversity and complexity of 
computer use.  Before dealing with problems on user profiles, however, it should be made clear, who uses 
computers and who does not and why not.   
 
The current study deals thus with the question to what extent private computer use is determined by socio-
economic background.  Studies that have dealt with this question so far have included the influence of social 
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inequality, region, and ethnicity.1  Beginning with the former, the digital divide is connected to socioeconomic 
inequality (e.g., Attewell, 2001; Bonfadelli, 2002; DiMaggio, Hargittai, Russel , & Robinson, 2001; Ekdahl & 
Trojer, 2002; Jung, Qiu, & Kim, 2001).  Usually, “classical” attributes like education and income are introduced 
to explain the digital divide.  A general finding is that the development of the digital divide parallels that of 
economic inequality (Attewell, 2001; Bucy, 2000; Ekdahl & Trojer, 2002; Luke, 2000; Martin & Robinson, 
2004).  A study on German teenagers from the lowest educational echelons shows that primary cultural skills, 
like reading and writing have to be improved before computer or Internet literacy may be acquired (Kubicek, 
2004).  For obvious reasons the use of new technologies like the Internet strongly depends on people’s computer 
skills (De Haan, 2004; Raban, 2004).  Thus, without a decent educational background people are unlikely to use 
a computer.  This underlines the catalytic effects of the digital divide on social inequality as mentioned above.   
 
Additionally, regional studies underline exclusionary trends.  Dolnicar, Vukcevic, Kronegger, & Vehovar 
(2002), for example, shows that the use of computers in Slovenia has fallen far behind that in the EU.  For the 
U.S., other studies forecast low income urban communities to be disqualified for further technological 
advancements (Servon, 2001).  Other findings underline the relations between a lack of means to invest in 
infrastructure and the underdevelopment of rural areas (Hollifield, 2003).  Others still stress that a general 
shortage of human capital in rural areas adds to a developmental lag (Malecki, 2003).  Results from a European 
project indicate that the digital divide remains a pressing matter (Anderson, Brynin, & Raban, 2005).  Compared 
to mobile technology (which has almost reached saturation level), for some time now the diffusion of the 
Internet has been stalling in various countries (ibidem).  Using computer technology is probably more heavily 
linked to social structure than mobile phone technology.2   
 
Research results on the influence of ethnicity cover a large range of issues.  Some show that the digital divide 
reinforces race antagonisms between the North and the South of the world (Nelson, 2002).  A study on ethnic 
differences between Anglo-Americans and Hispanics underscores the importance of ethnicity regarding the use 
of the Internet (Hacker & Steiner, 2002).  Ethnic studies on small group behaviour show that race influences 
participation modes in seminaries on new technologies (Carstaphen & Lambiase, 1998).  All these issues – social 
inequality, region, and ethnicity – seem to have a substantial influence on private computer use and need to be 
considered in a theoretical model.   
 
Before turning to such a model, however, let us look first at the level of computer use in Germany.  In 2002, only 
35 out of 100 people in Germany owned a private PC, accounting for a 15% increase between 1990 and 2002 
(IdW, 2003).  However, two issues are evident here.  First, most of the studies deal with the number of 
computers, hosts, Internet connections and the like without offering any explanation for the current 
developments (AG.MA, 2000; http://www.golem.de, 2000; http://www.heise.de, 2003; SPIEGEL, 1996; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003; Van Eimeren, Gerhard, & Frees, 2003).  This bespeaks a predominantly 
economistic view towards the problem, disregarding any social or cultural frameworks.   
 
Secondly, the more recent a study, the more positive its undercurrent.  In 1996, for example, concerns were 
voiced about the possible generation of status barriers regarding the use of new technologies (SPIEGEL, 1996).  
In 2003, however, a study appeared with the header: “More than half of all Germans are online!” 
(http://www.heise.de, 2003).  International comparisons show that in Germany, however, the private use of 
computers is at a moderate level at best (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003, p. 25).3  
 
One area in which a theoretical explanation is sought for the digital divide is an international comparison of the 
number of Internet hosts.  Here the diffusion rate of technology is related to general levels of trust and average 
material well-being in countries (Bornschier, 2001).  The study shows that an early diffusion of Internet 
applications within a country is connected to high degrees of average trust and tolerance.   
 
Despite numerous theoretical reflections on the matter, there is obviously a need for a more theory-driven 
approach to understand the development of the digital divide.  Most of the work reviewed here neglects the 
interrelationship of different levels of social structure in their theoretical and empirical models.  Studies on the 
digital divide often include the micro-level or perhaps the macro-level, but disregard household settings, which, 
because they represent people’s immediate social environment obviously have a direct influence on their 
                                                           
1 Another important domain of research not dealt with here connects the influence of policy or politics to the digital divide 
(e.g., Johnson, 2001 or Vartanova, 2002, for an overview: DiMaggio, et al., 2001).   
2 Although this division may become obsolete in the near future as computers are developing into hybrid technologies, i.e. 
mobile phones with integrated internet compliant computers.  
3 In 2002, 40.4% of all private households were supplied with internet access as an EU-15 average, the Netherlands leading 
with 65.5%, Spain and Greece at a low 29.9%, respectively, 9.2%.  In comparison, Germany’s level is intermediate.  Seven 
countries have a higher and eight countries a lower level (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003, p. 25).   
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behaviour.  Other studies will analyse the micro-level and include household effects, but fail to consider the 
influence of the macro-level, although ethnic and regional studies call attention to its importance.  In the next 
section I develop an encompassing new framework in order to build a multi-dimensional model.  After 
discussing the theoretical model, the next section contains an overview on the data and methods used for the 
empirical analyses.  Thereafter, the main analytic results will be presented and in the last section the most 
important outcomes are summarized and discussed.  
  
 
The Micro-, Meso-, and the Macro-Level 
 
The issues under investigation are reasons for people’s private use of computers.  In theoretical models, the use 
of computers resides at the highest level of a multidimensional concept of information technology access (De 
Haan, 2004).  The use of computers is based on skills, which are based on possession, in turn resting on 
motivation.  Without having passed any of the former stages, people are unlikely to use computers for their 
private means.  Starting from this perspective, the digital divide is now incorporated into a multi-dimensional 
framework (see Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1.  A Theoretical Model of the Digital Divide. 
 
 
Who are early adopters and why are they the first in line to use computers for their private means? Regarding the 
micro-level, one is mainly looking at effects of knowledge or human capital, that is, education and computer 
literacy.  For the meso-level one can identify household settings and their influence on individual computer use.  
Thirdly, the macro-level includes domains of group membership, that is, generation, gender, ethnic background, 
and differences between East and West Germany.   
 
Let us first concentrate on the micro-level and how knowledge influences private computer use.  Knowledge or 
human capital includes general and specific schooling and training, for example, high school diplomas or 
vocational training (Becker, 1964).  I assume levels of education and vocational training to be positively 
connected to people’s use of computers.  Presumably, computer literacy is merely an additional educational skill.  
What is more, people with moderate levels of human capital are likely to work with computers in white collar 
jobs (Korupp, 2002).  Getting acquainted with computers at work perhaps increases the likelihood that a person 
uses one for private purposes.  On the micro-level, a positive relation is expected between both a person’s 
general education and computer access at work on the one hand, and his or her private use of computers, on the 
other.   
 
The household level is particularly central to this study.  On the meso-level, the focus rests on household 
composition and consumption restrictions.  Studies on computer use in families are embedded within the 
ecological framework of family theory (Watt & White, 1999).  The ecological periphery of a family includes 
habitation and, more importantly, their technological environment.  The incentives for children to deal with 
Macro-Level: The Social Context 
Meso-Level: The Household 
Micro-Level: Knowledge 
Influence Private Computer Use 
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computers are straightforward: Computer use includes playing games interactively and facilitates doing 
schoolwork (Leu, 1991).  While catching the attention of children, teenagers, or young adults, the question 
remains how children induce their parents to use computers.4  Several issues are relevant.  For instance, parents 
may want to protect their children from unwanted informational contents.  The best way of doing so is to know 
how computers work and control the contents offered.  At this point we locate patterns of computer use in 
families at the level of control and regulation (Beisenherz, 1988).   
 
Additionally, the image of the computer has developed from a distant “cold” machine into a socially “friendly” 
device and according to newer research, the computer has “[…] successfully connected to middle-class ideals” 
(Reed, 2000).  So parents may simply want to adjust to middle-class ideals and ask their children to show them 
how to use one.  Parents may also believe computer literacy to be essential for children.  So to encourage them 
they may want to learn more about PCs together with their children.5  
 
As mentioned above, household income restricts consumption patterns of household members.  Therefore, a 
close positive connection is drawn between income and the possibilities to bridge the digital divide (Ekdahl & 
Trojer, 2002, Martin & Robinson, 2004).  This underlies the expectation that the digital divide mirrors structures 
of economic inequality.  In sum, on the meso-level the expectation is that both living with children and family 
income influence private computer use positively.  
 
On the macro-level the influence of the wider social context is included.  Several potential determinants are 
identified: generation, gender, ethnicity, and region.  The approach for generations is derived from a concept 
called “technical generations” and outlines four ideal types (Sackmann & Weymann, 1995): The “pre-technical 
generation” (born before 1939) grew up in an environment bare of household technology; the “generation of the 
household revolution” (born between 1939 and 1948) was raised while basic kitchen technology like kettles and 
refrigerators diffused into private households; the third “generation of advanced household technology” (born 
between 1949 and 1964) grew up with inventions like the washing machine, stoves, central heating, i.e. more 
sophisticated technology; the following “computer generation” (born after 1964) was raised with an increasingly 
digitalized set of home technology.  Today computer chips are implemented in microwaves, washing machines, 
fridges, telephones, heating systems etc.  According to the technological generations approach, the home 
environment that people are raised in determines their general habits towards new technologies later in life.  
  
The next determinant on the macro-level is gender.6  Today we still observe a troubling gender inequality when 
it comes to judging participation rates of women in any of the related fields of information technology (Fountain, 
2000).  Census data show that fewer women than men own a computer, particularly if they live in a single 
household (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003, p.24).  In 1997, only approximately 30% of all Internet users were 
women (Suler, 1997).  Research suggests that women are not socialized to become involved in matters of 
technology (Brunet & Proulx, 1989; Newman, Cooper, & Ruble, 1995).  Regarding computers, however, both 
men and women are fascinated by the multitudinal applications of this new technology, but women are less 
emotional about computers and geared mainly towards practical applications (Löchel, 1992; Newman et al., 
1995).   
 
Let me now turn to the last two aspects, ethnicity and region.  The major ethnic minority in Germany is a 
Turkish population of approximately two million members.  Following a large immigration wave in the 1960s, a 
number of Turkish people have lived in Germany for more than 40 years.  Still, Turkish people may tend to 
perceive the computer language to be culturally different, to belong to a so-called outer sphere (Nohl, 2001).  
Most of the computer programs bought in Germany use either German or English as languages for their user 
interfaces.  These distinctions may cause delayed diffusion of computers among the Turkish ethnic minority.   
 
Lastly, ten years after German reunification, large differences between the West and the East continue to exist 
including average prosperity, labour market chances, and political power (see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 2001; 
Geißler, 2002).  In 1993, the first official numbers on the distribution of home computers showed PC ownership 
in West Germany to be at a 22.4% level compared to only 16.3% of the households in East Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994).7  In the East, reasons such as insufficient funds or possibilities to purchase new 
                                                           
4To this day, the effects of computer use on children’s social development cannot be predicted precisely (e.g. 
Subrahmanyam, Kraut, Greenfield, & Gross, 2000).  
5 In contrast to this, a lack of primary social ties at home should decrease people’s use of computers.  
6 “Gender” is included on the macro level because sex roles are important for a whole set of social norms and values (e.g. 
Newman et al., 1995).  Effects of ethnic background and region seem to be important according to the literature mentioned in 
the introduction.   
7 Before that, the statistical yearbook of the GDR offers information on radio and TV ownership only.  From 1990 to 1993, 
the statistical yearbook for the reunited Germany contains information on PC ownership in West Germany only.  
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technologies before reunification explain part of their unequal starting position.  The final goal is to detect long-
term consequences of unequal starting positions regarding the digital divide.  Thus, on the macro-level, the 
expectation is that being a member of an older generation, being a woman, being a member of a ethnic minority, 
or living in East of Germany will influence the use of computers negatively.   
 
As new technology diffuses throughout society, one should be mindful of possible dynamic processes which 
exclude a static approach (see Figure 2).  For the study presented here, the expected development is derived from 
the technology diffusion model (Rogers 1995).  It states that over time, successful technology diffuses into all 
parts of society save into households in which people are resilient to change altogether.  The main pathways run 
from the highest to the lowest position, concerning education and social status (see Figure 2).  As diffusion 
continuously progresses and an increasing number of people use the new technology, computer and Internet 
access is less influenced by social inequality.  According to the technology diffusion model, one should expect 
the effects discussed above to decrease (Rogers, 1995).   
 
 
Figure 2.  Diffusion Pathways of Computers in Modern Societies. 
 
 
Data and Methods  
 
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal survey of private households in Germany (DIW, 2003).  In 1997, the 
use of computers for private and professional means was surveyed for the first time.  In 2001, these questions 
were posed again making an empirical replication of the model results possible for 1997 and 2001.  The 
unweighted number of individuals in the database is 11,636 in 1997.  In 2001, the unweighted number of cases 
increases to 20,708.8 
 
Table 1 contains the cross-sectional weighted number of observations, means, standard deviations, and ranges of 
all the variables used in the analyses.  The private use of computers is coded as a bivariate dummy variable 
(‘yes’=1 and ‘no’=0).9  In 1997, 23% of the German population between 17 and 99 years uses a computer, 
                                                           
8 Only foreigners living in Germany and not belonging to the Turkish minority were excluded from the analyses.  The 
increase of cases between 1997 and 2001 is due to a refreshment of the sample (DIW, 2005).  The GSOEP sample was 
refreshed in 2001 to counter problems connected to some of the anticipated future sampling biases that may have occurred 
due to sample attrition.  It must emphasised that this wave contains a representative sample for the population living in 
Germany in 2001.  Repeatedly testing a model is useful, because a successful empirical replication offer further evidence for 
precluding the presentation of chance findings.  I thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful remarks on this issue.   
9 The translated question used in 1997 reads as follows: “Do you use a computer either privately, on your job, in your 
training/education? (by computer include the personal computer (PC) or the main-frame but not purely a game machine).” 
The answers are coded separately for “private” and “job, training or educational” purposes.  In 2001 the question is posed: 
“Do you use a computer for activities not related to work?” The answer is a nominal “yes”/“no” scale.  Where the computers 
have been accessed or used was not surveyed.  
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increasing to 41% in 2001.  As some household members are adolescents, the GSOEP data contains a slightly 
higher figure of computer users than the one mentioned in the introduction (see:  IdW, 2003).   
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Contents of Variables Range           Mean (Std. Dev.) 
  1997 2001 
Privately Use Computers (No/Yes) 0/1 0.23 0.41 
Knowledge    
 Education (Year Proxy) 6-19 12.52 (3.2) 12.49 (3.3) 
 Use of a Computer at Work (No/Yes) 0/1 0.28 0.36 
The Household    
 No Children  0/1 0.26 0.27 
 Youngest Child 0-11 Years  0/1 0.18 0.17 
 Youngest Child 12-24 Years  0/1 0.20 0.20 
 Youngest Child 25+ Years  0/1 0.06 0.04 
 Adult Children Not Living at Home  0/1 0.30 0.32 
 Household Equivalent Income (D-Mark) 55-30000 2526.56 (1248.6) 2643.81 (1345.4) 
 Single Household 0/1 0.23 0.24 
The Social Context    
 Age 17-99 47.98 (18.3) 48.73 (18.3) 
 Pre-technical Generation  0/1 0.34 0.28 
 Generation of the Household Revolution 0/1 0.17 0.17 
 Generation of Advanced HH Technology 0/1 0.17 0.17 
 Computer Generation 0/1 0.32 0.38 
 Women 0/1 0.53 0.53 
 West German  0/1 0.78 0.79 
 Turkish 0/1 0.03 0.03 
 East German 0/1 0.19 0.18 
 
Weighted Number of Cases (in Million) 
  
47.7 
 
50.4 
 
Source:  GSOEP, cross-section weights (DIW, 1997, 2001). 
 
 
To study the effects on the micro-level (knowledge), the formal education of respondents is coded as a year-
proxy for the yearly equivalent of schooling and vocational training.  For instance, a university diploma equals 
19 years, whereas an Abitur equals 13 years of education.10   Calculated for the year-proxy, the formal education 
of the respondents ranges between six and 19 years in Table 1.  On average, respondents had 12.5 years of 
formal education in 1997 and 2001.  Of all respondents, 28% reported using a computer at work in 1997 and 
36% in 2001.  
 
To measure the effects of the meso-level, I used information on household settings (children and net equivalence 
household income).  To indicate some social restrictions that adult persons face, only the youngest child in a 
household entered the equation.  The age clusters for the children living at home are 0–11 years for young 
children, for teenagers and young adults 12–24 years, and for older adult children 25+ years.  In 1997, 26% of 
the respondents neither lived with children in their household nor reported any adult children living away from 
home.  Of all other people, 18% reported the youngest child in the household to be between newborn and eleven 
years old.  About 20% reported their youngest child to be between twelve and 24 years old, and 6% lived with 
adult children (25 years +) at home.  On average, 30% of the respondents reported having adult children living 
away from home.  In 2001, 17% of the people lived with children from newborn to 11 years old, 20% reported 
living with a child between 12-24 years, only 4% were living with adult children (25+ years) at home, and 32% 
of the people reported having adult children no longer living at home.   
 
Next, let us look at the household net equivalence income scaled by the OECD 2 scale.  The average net 
household equivalence income increased from 2,526.56 DM in 1997 to 2,643.81 DM in 2001 indicating an 
average rise of income of about 120.- DM.  This is in line with general findings (see:  Deutscher Bundestag, 
2001).  The last variable on the household level measures whether people live in a single household (reference 
group:  no single household).  In 1997 and 2001, 23%, respectively, 24% of the people lived in single 
                                                           
10 The years that are calculated according to the educational level are displayed in Appendix A.  
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households.11  Approximately half of these (54% in 1997, 56% in 2001) were “genuine” single households; the 
others were due to what is called an “empty nest” (table not shown).  
 
Let us now take a look at the macro-level variables within the general social context.  Most of the respondents 
belonged to either the pre-technical generation (34% in 1997, 28% in 2001) or the computer generation (32% in 
1997, 38% in 2001).  The generation of the household revolution and the generation of the advanced household 
technology contained 17% of the population in both waves.  The age of the respondents ranged between 17 and 
99 years with an average of 48 years in 1997 and 49 years in 2001.  The percentage of women in the data was 
53% in both waves.  In 1997, 78% of the population lived in West Germany and 19% in East Germany.  In 2001, 
80% of the people lived in the West and 18% in the East.  The remaining three percent were Turkish citizens (all 
living in West Germany).   
 
 
Results 
 
Because the dependent variable — private computer use — is coded in a bivariate mode a logistic regression 
model is used to display the influence of the covariates (Andreß, Hagenaars, & Kühnel, 1997; Morgan & 
Teachman, 1988).  In general, coefficients smaller than '1' signify a lower probability of private computer use 
(compared to the reference group).  Parameters over '1' altogether indicate higher probabilities.  The variables at 
interval level display marginal effects.  The cluster adjusted odds ratios of the net effects of the multivariate 
logistic regression in 1997 and 2001 are displayed in Table 2.12  
 
The results support the knowledge hypothesis that computer use is positively related to education and computer 
use at work.  In 1997 and 2001, education has a substantial and significantly positive influence (odds ratios in 
Table 2 are 1.10, respectively, 1.16).  The effect of the variable “Use of a Computer at Work” is large, too.  
People who work with computers are roughly four times more likely to use PCs for their private ends compared 
to those who do not (1997:3.99 and 2001:4.30).13 
 
At the household level – living with children and the net equivalence income – most of the expected positive 
relations are detected.  The variable measuring the influence of the presence of children under 11 years old in the 
household is non-significant in 1997, but significant in 2001.  It is possible that parents of younger children 
increasingly use computers as a side effect of the growing market for children’s software.14  Living with children 
aged 12 to 25 years seems best to support the notion of the second hypothesis.  The presence of teenager or 
young adults at home seems to make people almost twice as likely to use computers compared to people with no 
children (odds ratio 1.7, see Table 2).  The presence of adult children (25+) does not significantly affect the 
private use of computers.  In addition to specific generation effects (see below) in such households, we may be 
observing a peculiar social attitude: Perhaps because they do not feel responsible for their children’s spare time 
activities any longer, the elderly most likely leave it up to their adult children to use new technology.   
 
The positive household net income effect in Table 2 lends support to relations established elsewhere (Ekdahl & 
Trojer, 2002).  We observe the marginal income effects to be 1.02 in 1997 and 2001. Compared to the influence 
of teenage children (e.g., 1.70 in 1997), household income has to be well above the population average to have 
the same influence (3,500 DM in 1997, arithmetic mean from Table 2).15  Living in a “Single Household” has a 
                                                           
11 Official statistics show percentages of single households in Germany to be around 30%.  Statistical offices include all 
possible household affiliations of persons, whereas the GSOEP considers the composition of the current household only 
(personal communication DIW Jürgen Schupp, March 9, 2004).  The GSOEP household weights render the correct figures, 
but due to the research questions I use person weights.  Household weights are constructed to weight the GSOEP data on the 
level of the household, i.e. when using the household data.  Person weights, on the other hand, are used to weight the GSOEP 
data that is analysed on the individual level.   
12 The significance level is chosen at p < 0.01 due to the large number of cases in the data.  All other outcomes are rejected as 
chance findings. Odds ratios (or) are calculated by or=exp(log) and interpreted as relative probabilities. The net effects of 
Table 2 show the magnitude of the effect after controlling for all other variables in the model. Cluster adjustment takes place 
on the level of the household. Here the assumption of the independence of observations has to be relaxed because all 
members of the household have the same values for household variables (see Huber, 1967). The significance level for the 
changes in coefficients is not computed because the main methodical concern is to empirically replicate the results. In studies 
on social inequality it is difficult to extract trends within a small time frame of four years (for quasi-time dependent models, 
see Martin & Robinson, 2004). I thank the reviewers for pointing out this important issue. 
13 People who use computers for private ends are perhaps more likely to get a job which acquires computer expertise, too. 
14 In 2001 already, computer applications could be bought for very small children between two and three years.  
15 Note the equivalence income in Table 2 is divided by 100 to make the integers visible. The calculation is: 3,500= 
70/2*100. 
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strong and significantly negative influence on the private use of computers underlining the importance of 
primary social ties for innovation diffusion into private households.   
 
Table 2 
Odds Ratios for Private PC Use in 1997 and 2001 
 
  
Cluster Adjusted Odds Ratios
a) 
 Computer Use 1997 Computer Use 2001 
Knowledge   
 Education (Year-Proxy) 1.10** 1.16** 
 Use a PC at Work (Yes) 3.99** 4.30** 
The Household Context     
No Child Reported  Reference 
 Child 0-11 Years 1.01 1.33** 
 Child 12-24 Years 1.70** 1.65** 
 Child 25+ Years 1.14 0.80 
 Ad. Child not in HH  1.00 0.99 
HH Equiv. Income /100 1.02** 1.02** 
Single HH (Ref.: Shared Household) 0.70** 0.61** 
The Social Context   
Pre-technical Gen.  Reference 
 Gen. Of HH Rev. 3.68** 2.80** 
 Gen. Of Adv. HH Tec. 5.72** 4.96** 
 Computer Generation 9.29** 8.68** 
Women (Ref.: Men) 0.49** 0.63** 
West German Reference 
 Turkish 0.21** 0.30** 
 East German  0.72** 0.84** 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.25 
 
0.30 
Wald χ2 1611 4155 
No. cases (unweighted) 11636 20708 
Source:  GSOEP (DIW, 1997, 2001). 
**= p< 0.01 
a) Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the household level (Huber 1967).  
 
 
On the macro-level it was proposed that people belonging to the older generations, women, ethnic minorities and 
people living in East Germany would lag behind with respect to private computer use.  These hypothesised 
effects seem to hold if we look at the results in Table 2.  Compared to the oldest pre-technical generation 
(reference group), all succeeding generations display increasing odds ratios for using computer.   
 
In 1997, men are about twice as likely as women to use computers (odds ratio in 1997 is 0.49).  However, in 
2001 the odds ratio has increased to 0.63.  It may be indicating a slowly closing gender gap.  Regarding the 
Turkish ethnic minority in Germany, in 1997 Turkish people are four times, and in 2001 three times less likely 
than West Germans to use computers.  Thus, this effect remains to be substantial.  Also, indications exist for a 
negative effect of the unequal starting position in East and West Germany after the reunification.  The digital gap 
is still detectable roughly 10 years later, although it seems as if recently the East is catching up with the West.   
 
With respect to the diffusion hypothesis it must be said that effects on the micro and meso-level thus far seem to 
be unaffected by the diffusion process.  A tendency to decrease is not discernible between 1997 and 2001.16  In a 
way, only the variables on the macro-level seem to offer evidence for the possible existence of a diffusion effect: 
By and large, they are decreasing in size between 1997 and 2001.  However, one should not overlook that with 
an observation window of only four years (1997-2001) and two moments of observations it is still too early to 
judge this as conclusive support.  
                                                           
16 This result implies that future studies will have to focus on significant changes in the relations between the micro- and 
meso-level and the first digital divide.  
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Discussion 
 
Analysing what causes different levels of computer access provides valuable insights into a newly emerging 
issue for studies on social inequality.  The general question is, to what extent is private computer use determined 
by socio-economic background.  Empirical indications exist that socioeconomic background heavily influences 
computer access.  As expected, the net influence of individual knowledge influences private computer use 
positively.17  Early adopters are found in the upper educational echelons where people often use computers at 
work.  It may be concluded that this new technology does not diffuse haphazardly but systematically, via the 
work place into higher educated people’s homes.   
 
Regarding the meso-level the main finding is that having teenage children in a household enhances people’s 
likelihoods to use computers.  The explanation is at least twofold.  It may be a result of parents’ efforts to 
increase their computer proficiency because of a sense of responsibility for their children’s future skill needs or 
for their own need of control.  Likewise, children perhaps urge their parents to invest in computers and thus 
create an innovation friendly atmosphere at home.  The question whether we are looking at a “push” or “pull” 
effect has to be left to future research.   
 
Additionally, as other studies before show, net equivalence income increases people’s chances of using 
computers.  But comparing the size of the influence of household income to that of teenagers living in the 
household shows that income has to be well above the arithmetic population average to match the influence of 
teenagers.  For becoming a computer user the effect of having children, particularly teenagers, is remarkably 
strong.  Although living with teenagers perhaps occasionally might be trying, regarding the digital divide this 
household constellation seems to offer a competitive edge for computer access.  Of course, other forms of social 
capital are conceivable, like the friendship networks or the extended family.  Therefore, further studies are 
needed to see, whether social capital is indeed more advantageous than economic capital to bridge the digital 
gap.   
 
On the macro-level, the influence of belonging to a certain technical generation, or gender, or ethnic background, 
respectively, living in East Germany was analysed.  As all the hypothesised relations are empirically supported 
here, several conclusions may be derived.  Confrontation with computer technology at a young age seems to 
generate individual technological adaptability, though it is too early to proclaim a closure of the generation gap.   
 
According to the ambivalent role model, women were expected to be less likely than men to use computers 
privately.  Despite the empirical support for this hypothesis, conclusions should be hedged with caveats.  The 
data of the GSOEP does not contain a measure of some of the possible motivations of women for dismissing 
private computer use.  Due to this lack of information it remains unknown whether women try to meet some of 
the expectations mentioned implicitly in the theory.  A follow-up study should focus on this question.   
 
Looking at the empirical support for ethnicity, belonging to the Turkish minority seems to inhibit people from 
using computers.  This relation persists even if we control for knowledge, household settings and the social 
contexts.  The assumptions for the theoretical notions were that computers are perceived as cultural tools 
belonging to the “outer sphere” (Nohl, 2001).  Due to an ongoing acculturation when living in a foreign culture 
over time this effect may be expected to taper off.  However, the influence of belonging to the Turkish minority 
living in Germany is substantial.  To get more insights, why this is the case one would probably need 
information on the duration of time spent in Turkey or Germany.  More research on this topic is necessary to 
explain this large and persisting digital gap between the Turkish minority and the (West) German majority.  
  
Due to the unequal starting positions after reunification in 1989, it was expected that the digital gap is still 
detectable between the East and the West in Germany, more than 10 years after the reunification.  The empirical 
results show that this is the case.  Tentative hints exist that the digital gap is slowly closing.  However, more 
research is necessary to follow-up on this process and draw firm conclusions on possible trends.  
  
Generally, a firm judgement whether the abstract notions of the diffusion theory holds would be premature in 
view of the time window covered by this study.  A trend study at a later point in time is to be recommended.  By 
successfully replicating the empirical results in 1997 and in 2001 the probability of chance findings has been 
somewhat reduced.   
 
                                                           
17 All the empirical results discussed below are derived from so-called net effects that display the influence of a particular 
variable after controlling for the influence of all the other variables in the models (see footnote 12).  
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While substantial evidence has been produced for the emergence of the first digital divide the second digital 
divide may be already following in the wake.  Therefore, future studies should also concentrate on probable 
relations between the “first” and the “second” digital divide (Attewell, 2001).  These issues deal with the 
question how the chance of using computers and the purpose of their use may be linked to each other (Hargittai, 
2001; De Haan, 2004; Korupp, 2005).   
 
By and large, knowledge and household settings are very important for becoming a computer user.  How they 
may influence the rise of the second digital divide is still an open question.  Another worrying issue that remains 
is how a potential lack of social relations might be compensated to help close the digital divide.   
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Appendix – Coding for the Year Proxy of Educational Level 
 
Approximated Years of Formal Education  Graduation Level 
6 Volksschule ohne Abschluß 
8 Volksschule ohne Abschluß mit Lehre 
9 Hauptschulabschluß ohne Lehre 
10 Mittlere Reife ohne Lehre 
11 Hauptschulabschluß mit Lehre 
12 Mittlere Reife mit Lehre 
13 Fachhochschulreife/Abitur ohne Lehre 
14 Fachhochschulreife/Abitur mit Lehre 
17 Fachhochschulabschluß 
19 Universitätsabschluß 
 



















  
Causes and Trends of the Digital Divide:  
A European Perspective 
Sylvia E. Korupp  
Introduction 
The abstract notion of the digital can be defined as a division between individuals 
and households at different socio-economic levels, regarding their chance to access 
or use information and communication technology (OECD 2002). A theoretical 
division exists between the »first« and »second« digital divide, sometimes addressed 
as »first-level« and »second-level« digital divide (Attewell 2001; DiMaggio/Hargittai 
2001; Hargittai 2002). The »first« or »first-level« digital divide deals with the prob-
lems associated to accessing the internet, while the latter focuses on the user pro-
files, id est in which way and for what purposes the internet is used. Before studying 
different user profiles, however, reasons for accessing versus non-accessing the 
internet should be clear. Therefore, I investigate the »first« digital divide.  
Starting point of the research is a theoretical view on the digital divide that is 
embedded into an individual, institutional, and social framework. An encompassing 
three-fold model is based on theoretical concepts drawn from a micro-, meso- and 
macro perspective. On the micro level the effect of education is included. On the 
meso level I look at the household context. On the macro level the social context is in-
cluded. This model thus far has worked very well with German data sets (see 
Korupp 2004; Korupp/Szydlik 2005), but results vary within the European context. 
Parts of the variations unquestionably may be explained by cultural differences 
within countries.  
At times, research on this topic has been challenged by charges of studying a 
non-existent myth or »luxury« problem (Compraine 2001). Nevertheless, empirical 
results paint an entirely different picture as to how innovations can affect individual 
lives. For example, internet literacy is positively related to social activity and school 
performance (Wagner et al. 2001; Wagner et al. 2002), math and language skills 
(Attewell/Battle 1999), or success in finding a job (Boes/Preißler 2002). In order to 
identify which of the influences can be attributed to which variable a multivariate 
analysis is carried out. In the following section I will offer a brief overview on how 
the theoretical model is derived.  
3044 S E K T I O N  W I S S E N S C H A F T S -  U N D  T E C H N I K S O Z I O L O G I E  
 
Theory 
Issues of education include general and specific schooling and training, e.g., high 
school diplomas or vocational training (Becker 1964). I assume levels of education 
and vocational training to be positively connected to an individual’s use of the in-
ternet. In fact I presume internet literacy to be merely an additional educational 
skill. 
What is more, we see that age often is determined as a key issue, id est youth 
commonly grants a quick innovation adoption. In this case innovation diffusion 
spreads as over time the adopting young generations grow older (Watt/White 1999; 
Sackmann/Weymann 1995). According to this concept, the home environment that 
people are raised in determines general habits towards new technologies and thus 
age determines technological adoption odds. 
Regarding gender, I assume that women face contradictory role models in tech-
nology operating fields (see e.g., Waibel 1992). That is, they experience inconsisten-
cies when linking their job and household obligations regarding the use of the inter-
net (Collmer 1995). Other than in their job, for fulfilling household tasks usually 
they are not socialized to deal and become involved in technological issues (Collmer 
1995). The above facts and assumptions lead me to expect fewer women than men 
to use internet.  
Let us now turn to the meso level of the theoretical model. The image of the 
computer has developed from being a distant »cold« machine into a socially 
»friendly« device and is according to newer research, »(…) successfully connected to 
middle-class ideals« (Reed 2000). Parents may want to adjust to middle-class ideals, 
believing computer proficiency to be an essential future skill for children. These 
assumptions lead me to expect that living together with children enhances people’s 
likelihood to use a computer at home. A lack of primary social ties at home on the 
other had should decrease people’s use the internet. 
What is more, a close positive connection is drawn between income and the 
possibilities to bridge the digital divide (e.g. Attewell 2001; DiMaggio et al. 2001; 
Jung et al. 2001; Ekdahl/Trojer 2002; Bonfadelli 2002). Generally, household in-
come constrains purchasing power. Therefore one can expect family income to 
positively affect the private use of computers and internet. 
Moreover, ethnic minorities may perceive computer language to be culturally 
different, to belong to a so-called outer sphere (Nohl 2001). In all countries most of 
the computer programs bought use either the native or English language for their 
user interface. These cultural differences may cause a delayed diffusion of comput-
ers and internet among the ethnic minority.  
Last but not least, studies on regional aspects often stress exclusionary trends. 
Dolnicar et al., for example, shows that compared to the EU the use of computers 
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in Slovenia has fallen far behind (2002). For the U.S., other studies forecast low 
income urban communities to be disqualified for further technological advance-
ments (Servon 2001). Some findings underline a relationship between lacking means 
to invest into infrastructure and the underdevelopment of rural areas (Hollifield 
2003). Others stress that a general shortage of human capital in rural areas adds to a 
developmental lag (Malecki 2003). With regard to internet diffusion we can thus 
expect rural areas to be lagging behind compared to cities or urban areas. The entire 
assumed theoretical framework of the model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical ModeReferences 
Data and Methods 
The empirical analyses were carried out using the European Social Survey (see 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.com). Within my theoretical model I consider 
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the main theoretical and empirical results in the literature regarding the digital 
divide. Mainly, I expected the model to work out well in the European context, too. 
However, as we will see further down the model does not fit equally well in all 
countries. It contains a question on internet use and the other levels of the 
theoretical model from 20 European countries. The data were weighted by their 
design and person weights to calculate the descriptive statistics (see Table 1). In 
Europe we observe a distinct distribution of internet use along a north-south and a 
west-east-axis. Most of the people that use the internet can be found in the north of 
Europe, id est in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. Furthermore, we see that in 
Central Europe the countries in the West have a higher rate of internet users than in 
Eastern Europe. 
On average, educational levels are lower in Southern and Eastern Europe, com-
pared to their mean values in West Central Europe and Northern Europe.1 This 
may be a first hint towards the fact that innovation saturation may be related to 
country specific levels of education. The distribution of mean age does not vary too 
much, except for the value in the Czech Republic, which is slightly higher than the 
other ones. The gender distribution is roughly at the 50 percent level in all of the 
countries.  
Looking at the proportion of minorities in the countries we usually observe a 
percentage of two to three percent in the European Countries that were surveyed. 
The percentage of the age of the smaller children (age 0 to 14) ranges between eight 
percent (Czech Republic) and 18 percent (Luxembourg). The percentage of the 
youngest child being Teenage or young adult and living at home range between 16 
percent (Belgium, Spain, Great Britain, Luxembourg) and 25 percent (France). 
Adult children living at home are not reported quite as often anymore and may be 
highly dependent on the culture of a country. Here the range lies between one per-
cent (Sweden) and 20 percent (Slovenia). The approximated year household 
equivalency income ranges between a low 3.608,- Euro for Hungary and 28.486,- 
Euro for Norway. All currencies were computed in Euro to make international 
comparisons feasible.  
In Table 2, the computed odds ratios for the theoretical models are shown. This 
time only design weights are used because this is recommended for country com-
parisons by the research group of the European Social Survey (see http://www. 
european socialsurvey.com). Coefficients which are less than »1« signify a lower 
probability of private internet use in comparison to the reference group in the 
dummy variables. Regarding our variables at interval level, they display the marginal 
—————— 
 1 Educational level can take on the value one (primary or first stage of basic education), two (lower 
secondary or second stage of basic education), three (upper secondary), four (post-secondary, non 
tertiary education), five (first stage of tertiary education), and six (second stage of tertiary education). 
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effects. Parameters over »1« altogether indicate higher probabilities. If we look at 
the outcomes for all countries (column 1) we see that for every additional educa-
tional level the marginal effect of internet use increases by 76 percent. The effect of 
age is negative, indicating that the older a person is, the less likely this person be-
comes to be identified as an internet user. Furthermore, the effect of gender is 
negative, too, indicating that women in Europe are by far less likely to use the inter-
net than men.  
Living together with smaller children (up to 14 years) has a negative influence 
on internet use, but not living together with teenagers and young adults at home (14 
to 24 years). Here we observe an on average higher significant probability to use the 
internet. Living with adult children (25+ years) has almost no effect on the use of 
the internet. It remains insignificant for the analyses. Income is significant for using 
the internet, but as its marginal effects are small, the here chosen cut-off value for 
two decimals means that the effects do not show in the table. The Cox-Snell R-
square of the analysis is approximately at 33 percent indicating a fairly good model 
fit.  
Discussion 
This study deals with the question how we can explain variations on the digital 
divide model in a European comparative perspective. Starting point of my research 
is the appearance of a new form of social inequality: the digital divide. We see that 
the proportion of adult population in Europe has a distinct north-south and west-
east divide. A three-level model is build, to explain different levels of internet use 
and applied to 20 different countries in the European Union. Although the theo-
retical notions are based on the general theoretical and empirical results of the first 
digital divide and works fairly well in a universal model, a large variation is found 
within the 20 countries. Indications were found that the speed of innovation diffu-
sion within countries may be positively related to the country specific levels of 
education. Thus, the usual diffusion process seems to be a vertical movement from 
the highest to the lowest status positions along the socio-economic strata until most 
households are included.  
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Senior Citizens and Internet Technology 
Reasons and Correlates of Access versus Non-Access in a European 
Comparative Perspective 
Abstract 
As the Internet’s societal pervasiveness progresses, offline senior citizens are becoming 
increasingly disadvantaged from a socio-ecological point of view. This study looks at the 
reasons for non-use and the frequency, intensity, respectively socio-demographic correlates 
of Internet use among senior citizens in Europe. Consequences on the individual and 
societal level are discussed. The Eurobarometer of 2003 offers a range of variables to 
explore the diffusion of Internet technology among 55+ year-old people in Europe. 
Descriptive statistics and population average models are used to identify the correlates of 
Internet access in four different welfare regimes. Within the population segment of the 
senior citizens, age remains to be stratifying variable. Marital, occupational, and 
educational status have large impacts on relative chances to access the Internet. By and 
large, gender differences are significant. Although the size of the coefficients differs most of 
the results are replicated within the Euro15 region. Decisions to remain offline are based 
on private access possibilities, motivational indifference, and deficient knowledge; 
financial concerns are non-relevant. Existing socioeconomic inequalities crystallise within 
the senior population. Particularly in the Southern regions of Europe the digital divide is 
tightly intertwined with socioeconomic inequity. Social policy must keep up efforts to close 
the digital age gap.  
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1. Introduction 
In the European Union, the aging of the population is one of the major challenges most of 
its member states have to face over the course of the next decennia. Enhanced life 
expectancy and decreasing fertility rates result in an increased number and proportion of 
older adults. This study deals with the question in how far the age of a person is related to 
use of Internet technology, currently understood as a characteristic of ‘the making of 
successful aging’ (e.g., Czaja & Lee 2007). Technological adoption lags are unproblematic 
regarding ‘common’ household technology; whether or not people use microwaves, motion 
detectors, or washing machines is up to everyone’s own choice. Technology avoidance is 
becoming rather problematic, though, with respect to digital (communication) technology.1 
To date, more and more once personal public and private services are replaced by 
information technology driven devices.2  
Helpful recent developments include chat rooms for senior citizens, a European 
internet portal for health information, internet newspapers, or senior citizen list-servers that 
keep groups up to date with relevant online activities and help to build up social networks 
(i.e. BAGSO 2006, European Union 2006). The Internet offers access to online information 
on healthcare services or professional support, providing more autonomy to people with 
chronic diseases or illnesses (Czaja & Lee 2007). Being a non-liner excludes senior people 
from knowledge of current news, medical information, and connectivity to family 
members, social support, interactive play, and task oriented goals (Loges & Jung 2001). So 
Internet technology has the potential for assisting senior citizens in a large variety of 
situations related to aging (Selwyn et al. 2003). What is more, the symbolic character of 
setting up a computer at home is often under estimated (Mollenkopf 1998a: 231). 
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Essentially, using a normal but ‘youthful’ technology like the Internet demonstrates 
belonging to an up-to-date group with a modern lifestyle (Mollenkopf 1998b).  
Empirical studies on technology adoption confirm concise negative relationships 
between use of computer and Internet and the age of a person (e.g. Sackmann 1996, Korupp 
& Szydlik 2005). By and large, the diffusion of computers and the Internet into society has 
passed by older adults. In 2000, only 13% of people older than 65 years in the U.S. reported 
having Internet access (NTIA 2000). In 2005, 61% of the 55 to 74 year-old people in 
Europe reported never to have used a computer or the Internet (Demunter 2006). What 
explains the existence of such patterns? What sort of consequences might be expected with 
respect to quality of life in old age? One goal of this paper is to identify the prevalent 
reasons for not using the Internet; another objective is to explore empirically whether 
Internet access of senior citizens is determined by socioeconomic and cultural background. 
Before turning to empirical issues below some additional theoretical background is 
discussed. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Three different clusters exist within the domain of gerontotechnology. Firstly, a cluster 
called compensation technology, that makes up for sensory losses or functional limitations; 
secondly, an area of “daily life” technology covering devices for rehabilitation in order to 
improve a temporary or interim sensory loss or functional limitations; thirdly, and our 
current focus, a cluster tackling everything from “low” household to “high-tech” computers 
and Internet devices (Mollenkopf 2004). 
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Research on the latter considers two developmental lags that currently are producing 
an area of social tension. On the one hand, an individual lag occurs if social structure and 
the environment changes more rapidly than people’s abilities. This is the case if Internet 
diffusion advances more swiftly than the online skills of senior citizens. Part of the 
individual lag is countered by political measures to support senior citizens’ online activities 
(Mollenkopf 1997). Like a number of other countries, Germany has an Internet portal 
where training courses, online competitions, or general online information are offered to a 
“generation 50+” (BAGSO 2006).  
On the other hand, a structural lag exists concerning the mismatch between the 
changing capabilities of older persons and the opportunity structures of modern societies. 
Here, social structure and institutions will fail to keep pace with changes in individual 
abilities (Cutler 2006). Today’s young old, for example, do not agree with the current 
societal images of senior people. Therefore, it does not suffice to explain lower access rates 
of senior citizens merely by ‘age’. Considering long past childhood environments bare of 
technology or stocked with rudimentary household technology only, cohort effects may 
offer just as much explanatory power (Sackmann 1996). Additionally, individual 
biographical experiences, socialisation or compositional effects may be responsible for 
nowadays attitudes and beliefs of older people. A number of women, for instance, lack 
technical experience or leave it up to the other sex to deal with technological matters. As 
the proportion of women increases within higher age groups, average Internet versatility 
may decrease. If this effect is combined with the above cohort effect, gendered and 
historically specific socialisation effects crystallize with respect to Internet use.  
Additionally, individual characteristics like education and labour force participation 
may explain part of the observed correlations with age – as well as attitudinal gender 
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differences (Korupp et al. 2006, Dobransky & Hargittai 2006). Regarding the senior 
population and their use of the Internet, a connection between aging effects and 
compositional effects due to gender and socioeconomic status is pending explanation.3 
In the existing literature, a number of additional socioeconomic characteristics have 
been identified that correlate with the propensity of Internet use. For example, research 
shows that Internet laggards often live alone (Korupp & Szydlik 2005). As the Internet 
intrinsically is an interactive technology – covering direct as well as lagged communication 
– it is important to consider existing social ties at home. If there are (at least) two people 
living in a home, the exchange of information on Internet technology may become more 
interesting and entertaining. At an advanced stage of life primary social ties may prove 
important for individuals to remain involved in using the Internet. Limitations to take up 
gainful employment may present another reason for belonging to the group of laggards 
who use new technologies late or never. In a myriad of jobs, the Internet has become a 
common if not essential tool, increasing employed people’s likelihood to go online 
(Demunter 2006, Korupp & Szydlik 2005).  
Another general finding is that the development of the digital divide parallels that of 
economic inequality (Bucy 2000, DiMaggio et al. 2001, Korupp & Szydlik 2005, Korupp 
2006). In a typology of Internet users it is proposed that educational level enhances general 
levels of interest (Mollenkopf & Kaspar 2005). Internet skills can be assumed to be part of 
a general education - easier to acquire for people who already have a high level of formal 
schooling (Korupp 2006). Therefore, educational level probably will be positively related 
to the propensity of senior citizens to use the Internet. In the next section these theoretical 
notions will be tested with current empirical data. As the above notions are supposed to 
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cover general issues in the field of gerontotechnology a data base was used that would 
enable us to empirically replicate our model in different cultural settings.  
 
3. Data and methods 
Our analyses are based on the Eurobarometer of 2003 (no. 59.2), a large representative 
survey of the European population (ZA 2006).4 Data were collected between May and June 
in 2003 and include completed surveys on a total of 16,161 people. The sample we analyse 
is restricted to the senior population aged 55 years and over (N=5091).  
The two age categories we form (55-64 and 65+ years) are supposed to discern the 
‘young’ from the ‘old’ senior age. Within this group of the 55 to 64 year-old we are sure to 
find a large enough group of actively employed people to carry out sensible comparisons to 
retired or house persons. In studies on the digital divide we often observe basic and crude 
categorizations of the senior population segment (e.g. Demunter 2006). Distinguishing 
“young” and “old” senior citizens may allow for a more detailed view, since large 
socialization variations exist between these two groups (Sackmann 1996).  
The 2003 survey covered reasons for non-use and use of computer and Internet, and 
questions as to where, how often, and how many hours per week the Internet was used. 
Additionally, non-users were asked how they might be encouraged to use the Internet; and 
how they thought it would change their daily life if they did. All respondents were asked 
what kind of information they would like to find on the net, how they would use the 
Internet, and what sort of training they would require to use the Internet. Firstly, we 
proceed to outline the most immanent reasons for not using the Internet. Thereafter, we will 
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discuss the means and standard deviation of the variables used in the multivariate models 
and the results of the latter.  
Within comparative European research it has become common to differentiate 
between various welfare regimes (e.g. Ferrera 2000, Räsänen 2006). In our current work, 
four types serve to distinguish different institutional settings within European countries: 
The Nordic, Continental, Liberal, and Mediterranean welfare regime. The Nordic regime 
(including Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) is exemplary for issuing extended social 
benefits, reinforcing gender equality, and striving for full employment. The Continental 
regime (including Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands) 
accentuates a conservative “breadwinner” model with high institutional benefits 
encouraging motherhood, while striving for full employment (of men) and offering 
measured social benefits. The Liberal regime (including England and Ireland) offers modest 
social benefits only, while encouraging full employment and gender equality. The fourth 
type is the Mediterranean regime (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) which incorporates a 
high measure of reliance on family networks and offers modest social benefits. Countries in 
this regime are accentuated by a traditional Catholic culture.  
We expect to find older adults in the Mediterranean regime to use Internet to a 
lesser degree. Partly as a result of the welfare regime type, on average fewer economic 
resources exist in old age. What is more, countries belonging to the Mediterranean have a 
more agrarian structure, which, due to a more conservative outlook of the farming 
population, may initially counteract a swift diffusion of computer technology. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Reasons for not using the Internet 
The key reasons ticked by senior citizens for not using the Internet are shown in Table 1. 
Categories are sorted by their percentage in the Euro15 column.5 In Table 1, roughly 35% 
ticked the category “no computer at home” or “not interested”. These sorts of motives 
indicate a lack of means and motivational indifference. Result underlines former findings 
that senior citizens prefer to have a computer at home to access the Internet (see Selwyn et 
al. 2003).  
What is more, regional differences exist regarding these two motives. Compared to 
the Mediterranean regime, the Nordic, Continental, and Liberal regime have twice as many 
non-users at home maintaining that a missing computer at home is a key reason for not 
being online. Surprisingly, in-home computer access seems to be less important in the south 
of Europe compared to the rest of the EU15. For the option PC is too expensive (last row) 
the same regional differences exist: Only 1.5% of the senior citizens in the Mediterranean 
regime ticked this option while the other column percentages range between 8% and 10% 
(see Table 1). Lack of means seem to be less decisive for the choice of older people to 
remain offline in southern Europe. Perhaps this is due to a higher proportion of elders in co-
residence with their adult children in the southern countries. However, the percentage of 
elders ticking that they “don’t know what it is” or that they are “not interested” are the 
highest. So, a minority of 1.5% would prefer to use the internet but cannot afford it. A 
majority does not invest in Internet technology, not because they think it is too expensive 
but because they are not interested. 
- TABLE 1 HERE - 
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Another important category for not using the Internet is “missing skills”. Nearly 20% of the 
non-using senior citizens in the EURO15 region might consider going online if they were 
taught how to use the net. This is with regard to a growing age divide an alarming 
percentage. The same holds for about 13% of the senior citizens who ticked the next 
category “I don’t know what it is”. If these individuals received a substantial introduction 
to accessing the Internet they might be induced to go online.6 The reason “too complicated” 
is ticked by almost 12% of the non-users within the EURO15 region. On average, about 7% 
of the non-users do not access the Internet because they do not believe the contents of the 
Web to be useful. Only a little more than 6% of the non-users maintain Internet technology 
to be too expensive. The latter result underline former findings that financial concerns 
hardly affect Internet access (Korupp 2006, Korupp & Szydlik 2005).  
The descriptive results indicate that roughly 35% of the senior non-users simply 
lack opportunity. Between 10% and 20% of the non-users report skill related reasons, 6% 
think that the information on the Net is useless, and 7% report financial concerns as their 
main motivation for not using the Internet. Country differences indicate less familiarity 
with computers in the Mediterranean region.  
 
4. 2. Descriptive Analyses 
In order to examine the socio-demographic correlates of internet usage, our analytic model 
includes a binary dependent variable on internet use and several independent variables on 
socio-economic background: two age categories, marital status, educational level, 
occupational background, and gender. Table 2 presents the weighted cell percentages for 
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the variables used in the analyses according to the division of welfare regimes and for the 
entire EURO15 region.  
- TABLE 2 HERE - 
People living in a Nordic welfare regime not only have the highest number of computer and 
Internet users (Räsänen 2006) they also have the highest percentage of ‘silver surfers’ 
(Table 2). On average, 22.3% of the senior population in Europe are computer and 16.8% 
are Internet users (Euro15). Within the senior segment of the population we find about 40% 
of the individuals in our data to be 55 to 64 year old and approximately 60% to be more 
than 65 years old.7 Between 55% and 65% of the respondents live with a partner, while 3% 
to 4.5% report never to have had a partner. In 2003, 33% to 41% are not living with a 
partner.  
The next variable describes current occupational status.8 Most of the people in our 
data are retired, although substantial variations exist in the four welfare regimes. The 
Continental regime has the highest while the Liberal regime has the lowest percentage of 
retirees. The Nordic and the Mediterranean Regime are situated somewhere in the middle. 
Similarly, large differences within the welfare regimes exist regarding the percentage of 
house persons. The Nordic regime reinforces gender equality, so only 1.1% (otherwise 12% 
to 16%) of the people report to be a house person. Self-reported unemployment rates range 
between 2.6% to 2.8%. In the Mediterranean regime only 0.9% identify themselves as 
unemployed. In the EURO15 region 6.7% are blue-collar workers, again with considerable 
differences between regimes. In the Nordic and Liberal regime 10.4%, respectively, 13.8% 
are blue-collar workers. In the Continental and Mediterranean regime we find 5.6%, 
respectively, 4.4% of the people in this group. Between 7% and 9% of the senior citizens 
are self-employed in most of Europe. Only in the Continental regime this percentage is 
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lower, with on average 3.6%. Between 2% and 5% of the senior population are white-collar 
workers. The percentage of managers varies considerable with 8.6% in the Nordic regime, 
3.2% in the Continental regime, 4.5% in the Liberal regime, and 2.1% in the Mediterranean 
regime. The EURO15 average is 3.3%.  
Educational level has a prearranged ordinal scale containing three groups.9 
Altogether, 53.8% of the respondents have up to 15 years of education, 31.6% between 16 
and 19 years of formal schooling and 14.6% have 20 and more years of education. 
Educational level is distributed unevenly in the EURO15 region. The Nordic regimes show 
the highest percentage of senior citizens with 20 and more years of education, while the 
Continental, Liberal, and Mediterranean regime display the highest percentage of 
respondents with only up to 15 years of education. These results indicate that the higher 
expenditure of the Nordic regimes into their public educational system already is paying off 
through an on average higher educated population in old age. 
The results for the variable gender indicates that we have a higher percentage of 
women (56.1%), compared to men (43.9%) in our set of data. This bias is found in all four 
regimes and in parts may be allotted to the mainly male victims of WWII and the higher 
life-expectancy of women.  
 
4.3. Multivariate Results 
Two groups of individuals exist – users and non-users of the Internet – who are nested in 15 
European countries. In such a culturally varied region like Europe, we assume random 
effects to exist at country-level. Hence, a population averaged model with a method of 
generalized estimation equations (GEE) is used considering average random effects while 
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statistically computing the model coefficients (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000). This model is 
well-suited for describing large groups of subjects. Accordingly, the odds ratios (elog) in this 
table show the effect sizes for groups of subjects rather than for individuals. 
As we opt to put an emphasis on regional variation, coefficients are displayed for 
the four welfare regimes and the generalized Euro 15 model. The Wald χ2 test at the bottom 
of Table 3 indicates that the analytical models fit the data fairly well, albeit to a varying 
degree. We notice the best model fits are achieved for the Nordic and Continental welfare 
regimes and, consequently, the Euro 15 model. The lower Wald χ2 test values for the 
Liberal and the Mediterranean welfare regimes indicate a lesser model fit, although their 
test values are still acceptable. Weighting variables used to compute the probability weights 
of individuals in the data are included in the model (coefficients not displayed).  
- TABLE 3 HERE - 
We expected to find differences in the level of Internet use within the senior population 
depending on their age group. In Europe (Euro 15), older senior citizens (65+) are 
approximately half as likely to access the Internet compared to younger senior citizens (55-
64 years). In the Mediterranean regime age differences remain insignificant.  
The use of Internet as an interactive technology is supposed to be enhanced by the 
existence of social networks. With no better alternative in the data, we use “marital status” 
as an indication of ongoing social interaction. In Europe (Euro 15), senior citizens without a 
partner are significantly less likely to access the Internet. Note, in the Mediterranean regime 
the coefficient “never partner” inconsistently points into the opposite direction. 
 Regarding occupational status it was posed that regular paid employment yields 
some higher odds to use the Internet, because of increasing the number of people’s 
secondary social ties and possibilities to interact on the Internet. What is more, many jobs 
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today require online skills. The results in Table 2 show that white collar workers, managers, 
or self-employed people have significantly higher odds to go online. Empirical evidence for 
unemployed and blue-collar workers is somewhat varied. In the Nordic welfare regime, 
retirement seems to be the cutting edge to remain offline. Even if unemployed, people in 
the North have significantly higher odds to access the Internet if they are part of the labour 
force. Within the Continental regime, significant differences exist between seniors active in 
the labour force or retired, respectively, unemployed. Findings for the Liberal and 
Mediterranean welfare regime are similar. Unemployed older people, blue-collar workers, 
and retirees have a similarly low Internet access rates, compare to all other occupational 
status groups.  
 Educational level is essential when assessing the chances of people for accessing the 
net. Accordingly, in all models a linearly positive connection exists regarding the effect of 
educational level on Internet access. The size of the coefficients varies between the four 
welfare regimes, and to the highest degree within the Mediterranean regime.  
In the Euro 15 model, the variable ‘gender’ indicates significantly decreased 
Internet access odds for female persons. Odds are decreased in all of the welfare regimes, 
though a significant effect is identified only in the Nordic one. The non-significance of the 
“gender” effect in the other welfare regime tentatively may hint towards a decreasing 
importance of gender roles within the senior population segment.10 In the next section, the 
above results will be discussed in detail.  
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5. Discussion 
Computers are becoming pervasive throughout society. Since several years a trend towards 
an increased distribution of vital information via the Internet can be observed and this trend 
is unlikely to stop in the near future. With our work we want to answer what the prevailing 
reasons of senior citizens are for not using the Internet in a European comparative 
perspective. Additionally, answers are sought as to how individual socioeconomic and 
cultural background determines the likelihood of the Internet access of older adults.  
Regarding the first issue, the core reasons for not accessing the Internet are assorted 
along three main categories: lack of a device, motivational indifference, and deficient 
knowledge. Financial concerns hardly play a role, probably due to today’s low costs for 
computers and Internet and on average low poverty rates among pensioners. A lack of 
device as reason to remain disconnected might be linked to a lack of service for people who 
did not grow up with computers (Sackmann 1996). Problems may occur when choosing the 
computer model, hardware, software, or the appropriate installation routines. All this 
requires advanced knowledge about computer operating modes. Another big stumbling 
block might be a lack of information toward the learned decisions that have to be made 
long after a computer is purchased and set up at home (e.g., security issues, automatic 
downloads, freeware access, or malfunctions). Public access points - for example Internet 
cafés - cannot circumvent this problem. The cultural setting of most of these public points 
is unappealing to senior citizens and issues of confidentiality or security easily may alienate 
prospective older users. It is the device at home that facilitates access (Selwyn et al. 2003). 
Personal or confidential applications like email, online banking, or subscriptions to lists 
require positive subjective beliefs about security whenever they are carried out. In 
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conclusion, feigning non-interest may serve as a protection from alleged claims of - perhaps 
legitimate - notional inactivity.  
With financial concerns no longer at stake, some findings for the USA seem 
replicable within a European context (Selwyn et al. 2003). Based on expected welfare and 
commercial effects, one might have anticipated a more thorough support to follow suit and 
introduce basic computer technology into senior citizens’ households. Current results lead 
us to conclude that adequate modes lowering possible thresholds for setting up Internet 
connections at home are insufficient.  
Turning to our second question, answers were sought as to how socioeconomic and 
cultural background influences Internet access at an advanced stage in people’s life. Firstly, 
except within Mediterranean regime the empirical results show that considerable net 
differences exist between ‘young’ and ‘old’ senior citizens. Secondly, the existence of 
primary social ties in the household enhances the likelihood of older people to access the 
Internet. Further research will have to focus on the meaning of social ties for becoming a 
technology adopter. Thirdly, at an advanced age, employment and occupational status 
positively influence people’s odds to use the Internet. As soon as older adults retire, their 
propensity to access the Internet is considerably reduced. Additionally, higher education 
levels usually imply higher odds ratios to be online. And last but not least, women are on 
average less likely than men to access the Internet, though gender roles do not seem as 
pronounced for senior citizens, compared to younger age groups (e.g. Korupp & Szydlik 
2005).  
Generally, the empirical models support our theoretical notions, although some 
findings have to be hedged with a few caveats. The results show that cultural and 
socioeconomic differences exist in all of the four welfare regimes, albeit to different 
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degrees. The digital divide is accentuated in the Mediterranean regime where strong 
relationships between education and Internet access can be identified. The best model fit is 
achieved for the Nordic regime, where most of the senior Internet users are found. 
It remains undetermined how future generations of “silver surfers” will look like. 
Some studies rate future developments positively because coming generations will get used 
to new technologies throughout their lifetime (Mollenkopf 2004). Others take a rather 
hesitant point of view stating that today as well as in the past the pace of change through 
generational exchange has remained overstated. In every generation the needs and 
requirements of elders change as they advance into old age (Selwyn et al. 2003). Given the 
increasing speed of technology development, to some extent a structural lag may be a 
permanent characteristic of old age, at least as long as lifelong learning is not the general 
practice. 
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Table 1: The Reasons of Senior Citizens for Not Using the Internet  
 Nordic  Continental Liberal  Mediterranean Euro15 
No computer at home 49,7% 39,2% 48,0% 23,9% 35,2% 
Not interested 21,3% 35,8% 24,1% 39,6% 35,1% 
Missing skills 20,1% 16,4% 26,3% 21,2% 19,5% 
I don’t know what it is 8,9% 8,3% 6,8% 21,7% 12,9% 
Too complicated 7,7% 14,7% 10,1% 8,5% 11,7% 
Contents not useful 6,5% 9,0% 7,7% 3,6% 6,8% 
Internet is too expensive 8,3% 7,8% 9,0% 3,4% 6,4% 
PC is too expensive 10,1% 8,3% 10,6% 1,5% 6,2% 
N  169 2152 556 1591 4468 
Source: Eurobarometer 59.2 (May – June 2003), weighted data. 
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Table 2 Cell Percentages for Senior Population in Europe (55+ Years Old)   
 
 
Nordic Continental Liberal Mediterranean Euro15 
Computer Users 45,4 21,7 35,4 13,2 22,3 
Internet Users 36,9 15,3 33,1 8,0 16,8 
Age 
   55-64 Years 
 
41,8 
 
41,1 
 
40,1 
 
38,8 
 
40,2 
   65 + Years 58,2 58,9 59,9 61,2 59,8 
Marital Status 
   With Partner 
 
55,6 
 
56,1 
 
59,3 
 
64,1 
 
59,1 
   Never Partner 4,5 3,2 4,5 2,9 3,4 
   No Partner 39,9 40,7 36,2 33,1 37,5 
Occupation 
   Retired 
 
63,4 
 
71,1 
 
55,5 
 
65,3 
 
66,4 
   House Person 1,1 11,7 12,0 15,9 12,6 
   Unemployed 2,6 2,6 2,8 0,9 2,1 
   Blue collar 10,4 5,6 13,8 4,4 6,7 
   Self-employed 9,0 3,6 7,1 7,3 5,6 
   White collar 4,9 2,1 4,3 4,1 3,2 
   Manager 8,6 3,2 4,5 2,1 3,3 
Educational Level 
   Up to 15 Years 
 
29,1 
 
44,8 
 
58,4 
 
68,6 
 
53,8 
   16-19 Years 21,3 40,6 32,1 19,8 31,6 
   + 20 Years 49,6 14,6 9,5 11,6 14,6 
Gender 
   Men 
 
44,4 
 
43,4 
 
44,9 
 
44,1 
 
43,9 
   Women 55,6 56,6 55,1 55,9 56,1 
 
N  
 
1087 
 
2100 
 
560 
 
1344 
 
5091 
Source: Eurobarometer 59.2 (May – June 2003), weighted data.
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Table 3 Odds Ratios for the Internet Use of Senior Citizens in Europe (Euro15) 
 GEE Population Averaged Model 
(Z-Values) 
 
 
Nordic Continental Liberal Mediterranean Euro 15 
Number of Groups 3 7 a) 2 4 16a) 
Age 
   55-64 Years (R) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   65 + Years 0,46** 
(4,3) 
0,48** 
(4,7) 
0,58** 
(2,5) 
0,62 
(1,5) 
0,53** 
(7,0) 
Marital Status 
   With Partner (R) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   Never Partner 0,49 
(1,8) 
0,52 
(1,5) 
0,37* 
(2,1) 
2,43 
(1,5) 
0,60* 
(2,4) 
   No Partner 0,44** 
(4,8) 
0,59 
(3,3) 
0,37** 
(3,6) 
0,74 
(0,8) 
0,54** 
(6,3) 
Occupation 
   Retired/Houseper. (R) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   Unemployed 3,11** 
(2,7) 
0,78 
(0,6) 
2,59 
(1,6) 
1,95 
(0,6) 
1,62* 
(2,2) 
   Blue collar 1,94** 
(2,7) 
1,76* 
(2,5) 
0,6 
(1,4) 
0,40 
(0,9) 
1,46** 
(2,8) 
   White collar 8,06** 
(5,4) 
3,93** 
(4,4) 
4,51** 
(3,0) 
4,75** 
(3,6) 
4,52** 
(8,8) 
   Managers 18,29** 
(7,0) 
4,93** 
(5,7) 
2,58* 
(2,0) 
8,41** 
(4,5) 
5,96** 
(11,0) 
   Self-employed 2,02** 
(2,6) 
3,04** 
(4,2) 
2,20* 
(2,4) 
6,04** 
(4,6) 
2,45** 
(6,6) 
Educational Level 
   Up to 15 Years (R) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   16-19 Years 2,95** 
(4,5) 
1,96** 
(3,9) 
2,90** 
(8,3) 
6,64** 
(4,7) 
2,46** 
(7,9) 
   + 20 Years 4,47** 
(6,9) 
7,06** 
(1,39) 
8,35** 
(5,3) 
8,59** 
(5,1) 
5,61** 
(13,3) 
Gender 
   Men (R) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   Women 0,61** 
(3,0) 
0,82 
(1,4) 
0,97 
(0,1) 
0,66 
(1,5) 
0,78** 
(3,0) 
Wald χ2 218 213 58 63 440 
N 1087 2100 560 1344 5091 
Source: Eurobarometer 59.2. Weighting variables are included in the model (results not shown). 
* = p<0.05%; ** = p<0.01%. 
a) Germany is included as East and West Germany. 
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Endnotes 
                                            
1
 Although indications exist for a merging process of Internet, mobile, or organizational technology, today’s 
Internet technology remains to have capabilities beyond those of mobile phones or personal organizers.  
2 For example, money access machines, bus and railway ticket vendors, online civil or travel agencies.  
3
 Panel or life history data are needed to discern such effects. With the data used here we cannot distinguish 
between age and cohort effects. To our knowledge, publicly available panel information on the Internet use of 
older adults in Europe does not exist.  
4 Included are (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and The Netherlands.  
5
 We discuss items that were ticked by more than 5% of the senior population. Other items that non-users 
were able to choose are: ‘I have no time’, ‘I have no computer at work’, ‘there is no public access point’, ‘the 
technical barriers are too high’, ‘the Internet is not secure enough’, ‘existing language barriers’, ‘problems 
with the provider’, ‘other reasons’, respectively, ‘unspecified’ (question 47, 59.2 Eurobarometer survey).  
6
 Percentages cannot be added because multiple answers were possible. 
7
 The age of the respondents in the models ranges between 55 and 96, with a mean of 68 years and a standard 
deviation of eight years (Table not shown). 
8
 Analysing current occupational status serves to compare effects of retirement / non-employment to paid 
employment without an unnecessary inflation of the model variance (e.g., using educational / occupational 
level and income). Occupational status serves as a rough indicator for financial resources. 
9
 We excluded a small group of current students (N=12). 
10
 As one replication carried out with the European Social Survey (2004) showed consistently significant 
gender effects at an advanced life stage this result needs some additional empirical replication. 
